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A Fenyes/E Karner/H Koziol/E Steiner (eds), Tort Law in the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights (De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2011). xxiv + 906 pp.
ISBN 978-3-11-025966-7. € 199.95 (hardback).
Supported in part by an operating grant from the European Commission, this
collection of essays constitutes the outputs of a project conducted by the Institute
for European Tort Law of the Austrian Academy of Social Sciences and the
European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law. According to the Preface, the goal of
the project ‘is to give a general overview and thorough analysis of how the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deals with tort issues when applying
article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), how its approach
towards those issues might be different from that of national courts and to what
extent it follows general principles of European tort law’. In many ways an
intimidating and impressive collection of essays, running to 900 pages, the range
of perspectives presented is rich and can only enhance the reader’s understand-
ing of the jurisprudence developed under the ECHR, as well as deepen the under-
standing of the domestic tort lawyer. From the perspective of this reviewer,
however, the title of the work is somewhat misleading as it suggests analysis of
ECtHR jurisprudence generally. In fact, the collection is described as being
focussed on art 41 of the ECHR which provides that:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto,
and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial repara-
tion to be made, the Court shall, if necessary afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
A comprehensive attempt to establish the principles which guide the ECtHR in its
decision-making under art 41 is to be lauded and welcomed; commentators unan-
imously decry the lack of coherence and predictability in the application of art 41.
The literature frequently refers to the lack of ‘principles’ and ‘parsimonious reason-
ing’1; the fact that five sections and a Grand Chamber are all taking decisions on
just satisfaction has led to inconsistency.2 However, this project has greater ambi-
tion than establishment of principles informing art 41 jurisprudence. The aim is
also to elucidate how European principles of tort law are reflected in that jurispru-
1 J Varuhas, A Tort-Based Approach to Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 (2009)
Modern Law Review (MLR) 750, at 750.
2 DJ Harris/M O’ Boyle/Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd
edn 2009) 856.
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dence. The question that arises, though, is how the knowledge and practice of
national domestic lawyers will be enhanced as a result of this exercise. The target
audience for this work is somewhat unclear, although the editors close their
Preface by expressing the hope that this book will assist the ECtHR in its
‘difficult, demanding and responsible task’.
The collection is divided into two parts: the first, dealing with ‘Fundamental
Issues’, including a detailed treatment by Franz Bydlinski of art 41 jurisprudence
and the second part addressing ‘Special Topics’ such as Damage, Causation,
Wrongfulness and Fault and the Protective Purpose of the Rule.
Consideration of art 41 can only arise where two pre-requisites are satisfied:
(i) there must have been a violation of the Convention or its protocols; and (ii) in-
ternal law should allow only partial reparation. Thus, the liability to compensate is
linked to a Convention violation and the jurisprudence under the ECHR articles
and its protocols reveal many tort-inspired bases of liability. The conceptual
challenge for commentators addressing this project is that European tort principles
are not easily assimilated to art 41 per se. Of necessity, therefore, the legal analysis
must focus on the jurisprudence relating to theECHR rights. The clearest exposition
of the stages in the analysis is set out by Steininger and Wallner-Friedl in their
chapter on ‘Wrongfulness and Fault’. As they rightly observe, the fact that the
ECHRdoes not refer towrongfulness or fault does notmean that such issues are not
relevant to art 41. They go on to cite the European Commission of Human Rights
which stressed: ‘The responsibility of a State under the Convention, arising for acts
of all its organs, agents and servants, does not necessarily require any “guilt” on
behalf of the State, either in a moral, legal or political meaning’ (p 505).
The authors quite appropriately then identify that while art 41 does not
require any subjective blame on the part of the state before compensation can be
awarded, in order to establish a violation of the substantive article it is necessary
to consider whether the state has fallen below any required standard of conduct
as prescribed by the ECHR and its jurisprudence. The point is that the gateway to
just satisfaction is a violation of the ECHR – comparative analysis of ECHR
jurisprudence and the related relevance of tort law principles has largely to take
place at the level of the substantive articles. One is put in mind of the function-
ality principle applied by comparative lawyers and described by Zweigert and
Kötz: ‘in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil the same
function’.3 Thus, the authors acknowledge that it is useful to avoid notions of
‘wrongfulness’ and ‘fault’ since they are charged with national concepts and
3 K Zweigert/H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998)
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instead they base their analysis of compensation under art 41 on the functional
approach chosen by the European Group on Tort Law. This requires that three
issues are addressed: (i) did the actor violate an imperative rule forbidding certain
conduct or endanger protected rights or interests; (ii) did the actor violate an
objective standard of conduct and (iii) subjective fault.
Subjective fault being irrelevant (p 505), the authors move to examine (i) and
(ii) by considering the ECtHR’s practice regarding a ‘violation of the Convention’
which is the prerequisite for liability under art 41 ECHR (p 508). The authors then
proceed to analyse the conduct standards under a number of articles but they do
not elaborate what this means in terms of art 41 – this highlights the limitations
of the work. If there is no effective analytical bridge between art 41 and the
substantive articles under the ECHR and its protocols, it is hard to see how this
dimension of the project significantly enriches our understanding beyond the
analysis of art 41 to which we already have access in recognised and leading
works on the ECHR.
Conversely, in his chapter on ‘Methodological Approaches to the Tort Law of
the ECHR’, Bydlinski eschews any need to examine the requirements for the
‘violation of individual Convention rights in [his] tort law investigation. Thus, no
more than unlawfulness in the sense of a violation of the Convention is required’
(p 54). This approach is at odds with the Steininger and Wallner-Friedl chapter
and the contrast between the two highlights a lack of conceptual clarity which
for this reader lies at the heart of the project. Is the project about art 41 per se,
or is it about the mediation of generally recognised principles of tort law into
ECHR jurisprudence? Or is it about the mediation of tort law principles through
art 41?
This collection would have benefitted from a strong editorial hand. The first
chapter (Steiner, ‘Just Satisfaction under Article 41 ECHR: A Compromise in 1950
– Problematic Now’) is focussed on the history of art 41 and concludes with
discussion of recent reforms, including the Article 41 Unit set up in 2006 with the
Registry of the Court (which advises the Chambers on levels of awards) as well as
proposals for further reforms. What it does not do is lay the ground clearly for the
following papers – this is a great shame as clearly the individual contributors
have explored their own topics in great detail but from a very personal perspec-
tive. This reader found the lack of a clear and consistent framework for inquiry a
major impediment to appreciating the work. Furthermore, the lack of rigorous
editing is manifest in the inevitable repetition that occurs – for example, there is
inevitably duplication in the Jozon chapter (‘Satisfaction by Finding a Violation’)
of the topics covered by Bydlinski.
Criticism notwithstanding, there is much to be welcomed in this work and
this reviewer would single out Bydlinski’s chapter (‘Methodological Approaches
Book Reviews 349
Brought to you by | Periodicals Section, Albert Sloman Libr.
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/26/15 4:24 PM
to the Tort Law of the ECHR’) will be welcomed by all scholars and practitioners
who seek to understand the principles guiding the ECtHR under art 41.
Berka’s chapter (‘Human Rights and Tort Law’) takes another approach and
examines the relationship between human rights and tort law from three perspec-
tives: tort law liability of the state for infringements of fundamental rights; the
adoption of tort law to implement fundamental rights protection duties with
respect to legal relations between private persons and the limitation of tort claims
by fundamental rights. While acknowledging the desirability of undertaking the
project against the background of as many private law systems as possible, this
exceeds the bounds of an individual investigation and he confines his domestic
exemplar to Austria. This is a large canvass, which takes us way beyond the
confines of art 41 (and beyond the scope of the project as envisaged in the
Preface) and which requires more detailed analysis than would be feasible in this
collection.
The second half of the collection, which is devoted to ‘Special Topics’, follows
a different format. First, the authors discuss the selected topic (Damage, Causa-
tion, Wrongfulness and Fault etc) and then conclude with comparative remarks.
There is much to be commended in these chapters and the detailed treatment of
‘Compensation for Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Loss’ by Kissling and Kelliher is
particularly welcome. However, the complexity and scale of the project challenge
is manifest. As several authors acknowledge (for example, Oliphant and Lud-
wichowska, ‘Damage’ and Steininger and Wallner-Friedl, ‘Wrongfulness and
Fault’), comparative reflections are overly ambitious given the wide variety of
jurisdictions and the considerable variation in concepts.
In conclusion, our understanding of art 41 jurisprudence, as well as the role
that tort law concepts play in ECHR jurisprudence generally, is enhanced con-
siderably in the light of Tort Law in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights. The reader has to work hard, though, and to make the most of the
analysis needs a framework of reference that is based upon an already deep
understanding of tort law, comparative law and international human rights law.
As previously indicated, it is a pity that this framework is not established clearly
at the outset.
Jane Wright: Professor of Law, University of Essex, E-Mail: jeaw@essex.ac.uk
350 Jane Wright
Brought to you by | Periodicals Section, Albert Sloman Libr.
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/26/15 4:24 PM
